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After Fabe: Applying the Pireno Definition
of "Business of Insurance" in First-Clause
McCarran-Ferguson Act Cases
Peter B. Steffent

When there is so much to be known, when there are so
many fields of knowledge in which the same words are
used with different meanings, when every one knows a
little about a great many things, it be comes increasingly
difficult for anyone to know whether he knows what he is
talking about or not.
T.S. Eliot1
T.S. Eliot observed that words often changed their meanings:
what was once definite had become indefinite.2 While even the
most avid lawyer would have difficulty finding poetry in
insurance law, Eliot would likely sympathize with the current
conundrum regarding interpretation of § 1012(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Like poetry, the provision uses the same
words to mean different things.
Following the Supreme Court's 1868 decision in Paul v
Virginia,3 federal courts initially took the position that issuing
insurance policies was not a transaction in interstate commerce,
and therefore was not subject to federal regulation.4 To reach this
conclusion, the Paul Court likened issuing an insurance policy to
agreeing to a personal contract, describing both as distinctly local
transactions.
The Supreme Court's understanding that the states had sole
authority to regulate the insurance industry changed, however,
with the Court's expansion of the scope of federal regulation over
t A.B. 1998, Washington University; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Chicago.
1 T.S. Eliot, "The Perfect Critic," The Sacred Wood 10 (Methuen 1920).
2 Id at 9.
3 Paul v Virginia,75 US 168' (1868).
4 See id at 183 ("Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.").
5 Id.
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interstate commerce.' This expansion of federal power reached its
zenith in United States v South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,7 in which the Supreme Court held that "[no
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities
across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We
cannot make an exception of the business of insurance. " '
In response, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act 9
("the Act") within a year of South-Eastern Underwriters.10
Congress sought to maintain the state insurance regulatory
system existing prior to South-Eastern Underwriters by
prohibiting most methods the federal government might
naturally use to regulate insurance, such as incidental taxes or
antitrust laws."
Section 2(b) of the Act contains two clauses, each of which
employs the phrase "business of insurance." The first states:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance ...."
The first clause addresses the reverse preemption of state law
over federal law in this field.'3 The McCarran-Ferguson Act thus
enables state law to supersede and preempt federal law. The
second clause of § 2(b) states:
Provided, That after June 30, 1948, ... the Sherman Act,
... the Clayton Act, and ... the Federal Trade
Commission Act ...shall be applicable to the business of
6 See United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 US 533, 552-53
(1944) (defining the federal power to regulate commerce as a positive power with no
exception for any commercial enterprise which conducts its business across state lines).
7 United States v South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation, 322 US 533 (1944).
8 Id at 553.
9 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub L No 79-15, 59 Stat 33 (1945), codified at 15 USC
§§ 1011-15 (1994).
10 See Securities and Exchange Commission u National Securities, Inc, 393 US 453,
458 (1969) ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in reaction to this Court's decision in
[South-Eastern Underwriters].").
11 Lee R. Russ, 3 Couch on Insurance § 2:4 at 2-12 (Clark 1994) ("McCarran-Ferguson
turns the traditional rule of federal preemption of state law on its head.").
12 15 USC § 1012(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
13 Russ, 3 Couch on Insurance § 2:4 at 2-12-13(cited in note 11).
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extent that such business is not regulated
insurance to the
4
by State law.'

The second clause exempts the business of insurance, not the
business of insurance companies, from federal antitrust law when
state antitrust law applies." In other words, it exempts activities,
not companies, from federal antitrust law.
Although both clauses in the Act include the same "business
of insurance" language, the phrases do not always mean the same
thing. Courts have molded a definition of the phrase "business of
insurance" in the antitrust context of the second clause of § 2(b).
Subsequent first-clause McCarran-Ferguson Act cases have
reached different interpretations in non-antitrust contexts. 7
While the second-clause antitrust definition can prove helpful in
some first-clause cases, the antitrust context of "business of
insurance" does not provide the optimal definition for nonantitrust cases.
In Part I, this Comment discusses the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision and the origin of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Part II examines various attempts by the courts to define
"business of insurance," beginning with SEC v National
5 and concluding with the recent confusion in the
Securities,"
federal courts after the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on
the issue, United States Departmentof Treasury v Fabe.'9 Part III
argues that the antitrust and preemption clauses are
fundamentally different, even though the antitrust cases can
provide direction to preemption analysis. Depending on the
14

15 USC § 1012(b) (emphasis added).

15 Russ, 3 Couch on Insurance § 2:4 at 2-12-14(cited in note 11).
16 See Part II B.
1 See Part II C.
18 SEC v National Securities, 393 US 453, 460 (1969) (holding that "[s]tatutes aimed
at protecting or regulating this relationship [between the insurance company and the
policy holder] .. .are the 'business of insurance").
19 United States Departmentof the Treasury v Fabe, 508 US 491 (1993) (noting that a
statute that regulates policyholders is for the business of insurance while a statute that
furthers the interests of creditors is not regulating the business of insurance). Two more
recent Supreme Court cases touched on § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, but not in
ways that impact this analysis. UNUM Life Insurance Co of America, 526 US 358 (1999),
reiterated that the none of the criteria listed in Union Labor Life Insurance Co v Pireno,
458 US 119 (1982), are determinative by themselves. UNUM, 526 US at 373-74. See text
accompanying note 93 for a further discussion of this aspect of Pireno. Barnett Bank of
Marion County, NA v Nelson, 517 US 25 (1996), never discusses what the "business of
insurance" entails. Rather, it defines what "specifically relates" means in relation to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's language that a statute must specifically relate to the business
of insurance. Id at 39.
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clauses and context of the Act, there are, therefore, two separate
meanings of the phrase "business of insurance."
I. SOUTH-EASTERN UNDERWRITERS AND THE BIRTH OF THE

MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

Paul v Virginia" established that the issuance of insurance
policies was subject only to state regulation because issuance was
not an interstate transaction. Thus, to regulate insurance was
beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power.2 Because Paul
preceded the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it did
not resolve whether federal antitrust laws could govern
anticompetitive practices in the insurance industry. The Supreme
2 2 An
Court reached this question in South-Eastern Underwriters.
essential part of the Court's inquiry was whether Congress could
regulate the business of insurance as interstate commerce.2 3
A.

United States v South-Eastern Underwriters

South-Eastern Underwriters concerned nearly two hundred
insurance companies charged with conspiring to fix fire insurance
policies in Georgia at noncompetitive rates in violation of the
Sherman Act.24 The district court dismissed the indictment
because, under Paul,the business of insurance was not interstate
commerce.2 5 Congress therefore lacked the constitutional
authority to regulate insurance companies' activities by means of
the Sherman Act.26
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, ruling that the
business of insurance was interstate commerce, and thus that the
Sherman Act applied to insurance companies' alleged
monopolistic behavior. 27 The Supreme Court defined "business of
insurance" quite broadly, to include all negotiations and

Paul,75 US at 168.
See text accompanying notes 4-6.
22 South-Eastern Underwriters,322 US at 538-39.
23 See id at 546-50 (explaining that the Court may examine the entire transaction to
20

21

determine if there is "a chain of events which becomes interstate commerce").
24 Id at 535-36.
25 See United States v South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation, 51 F Supp 712, 71415 (N D Ga 1943), revd, 322 US 533 (1944).
26 See South-Eastern Underwriters,51 F Supp at 714-15.
27 South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 US at 552-53 ("The decision now rendered
repudiates this long continued and consistent construction of the commerce clause and the
Sherman Act.").
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transactions before and after the creation of an insurance policy.28
Under this definition, the writing and signing of the insurance
policy became a small subset of the business of insurance.2 9
Although Justice Black's majority opinion emphasized that the
decision did not alter existing state authority to regulate
insurance, the insurance industry feared Congress would soon
attempt to use South-Eastern Underwriters to fashion federal
regulation. To alleviate such concerns, Congress enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act nine months after the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision. The Act effectively overturned the
Supreme Court's holding in that case. 3
B. The Congressional Response: The McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act did not return the law to its
position prior to South-Eastern Underwriters. Rather, the Act
contained two clauses embodying a congressional effort to
balance state and federal interest in regulating the "business of
insurance." The first clause enabled state law to supersede
federal law; the second clause provided a federal antitrust
exemption for the "business of insurance."32 The Act gave states
some powers they did not have before, by stating in the first
clause that only a federal law that "specifically relates to the
business of insurance" can preempt a state law dealing with
insurance. 3 Congressional legislation merely affecting insurance
would not meet the first-clause test and thus would not, be
exempt from the general prohibition on preemption. 4 Rather, in
order to apply, federal law must specifically relate to the
"business of insurance."
The second clause of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which
governs antitrust actions, confers potentially significant power on
the federal government by allowing federal antitrust laws to
apply to the extent that state laws do not regulate the business of

Id at 541-42.
See id.
30 See id at 561-62 (disagreeing with the defendants' "gloomy forebodings" and
"suggestions of disaster to business").
31 See notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
32 15 USC § 1012(b). See also notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
33 See notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
34 Russ, 3 Couch on Insurance§ 2:4 at 2-12-14 (cited in note 11).
28
29
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insurance. 5 The second clause serves, in part, to counterbalance
some of the power granted to the states in the first clause.36
Within months of the enactment of the Act, the Prudential
Insurance Company challenged the Act's constitutionality.
Prudential argued that a South Carolina tax on foreign insurers
was unduly burdensome to interstate commerce. Basing its claim
on the South-Eastern Underwriters decision and the Commerce
Clause, Prudential alleged that Congress could not use the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to limit the Commerce Clause, thereby
granting the states powers which are constitutionally reserved to
the federal government.3 7 The Supreme Court rejected
Prudential's arguments in PrudentialInsurance Co v Benjamin,
holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was constitutional.3 8
Specifically, the Court held that states could constitutionally
regulate interstate insurance transactions
as long as
contradictory federal legislation did not specifically relate to the
business of insurance. 9 Justice Rutledge's majority opinion
adopted a broad definition of "business of insurance" similar to
that first articulated in South-Eastern Underwriters."' Therefore,
the business of insurance included everything from the issuance
of an insurance policy to the payment of an insurance claim.4 1
II. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE "BUSINESS OF INSURANCE"
Few Supreme Court cases since Prudential have examined
the scope of "business of insurance." It is inherently a case-bycase problem, requiring courts to consider the particular facts of
each dispute.4 2 It was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court
reexamined the subject in SEC v National Securities.4 3 As later
35 See id.
36 See Part III for further discussion of the compromise that led to the McCarranFerguson Act.
37 See Prudential Insurance Co v Murphy, 35 SE2d 586, 587-88 (SC 1945), affd as

PrudentialInsuranceCo v Benjamin, 328 US 408 (1946).
38 PrudentialInsuranceCo v Benjamin, 328 US 408 (1946).
39 See id at 430-31 (stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act removed obstacles to

state action arising from congressional laws).
40 See id at 416-17 n 15 (describing Prudential's business in terms of policies issued
and claims paid).
41 Id.
42

See Group Life & Health Insurance Co v Royal Drug Co, 440 US 205, 252 (1979)

(Brennan dissenting) ("The process of deciding what is and is not the 'business of
insurance' is inherently a case-by-case problem.").
43 SEC vNational Securities, 393 US at 459-60 (considering the scope of the business
of insurance).
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cases dealt more frequently with the antitrust context of the
second clause, the Supreme Court would subtly shift its definition
of the phrase.44
A. SEC v National Securities
National Securities,45 a first-clause McCarran-Ferguson case,
concerned state preemption rather than antitrust. The case arose
when the Arizona Director of Insurance approved the merger of
two Arizona insurance companies as complying with relevant
state law. 46 However, the SEC sued to stop the merger, alleging
that the companies violated the Securities Exchange Act 47 when

they distributed
shareholders

misleading

solicitation

materials

to

the

of one of the companies. 4' The district court

dismissed the case on the ground that the SEC could not interfere
with Arizona's merger approval process and concluded that
Arizona had authority to permit the merger under the general
power of the states to regulate the "business of insurance." 49 The

Ninth Circuit then affirmed this decision without attempting to
define "business of insurance.""
Justice Marshall wrote the Supreme Court's opinion reversing
the Ninth Circuit. The opinion offered a definition of the phrase
"business of insurance." "[W]e do not believe that a state statute
aimed at protecting the interests of those who own stock in
insurance companies comes within the sweep of the McCarranFerguson Act. Such a statute is not a state attempt to regulate
'the business of insurance."'5 1 Justice Marshall also stated that
McCarran-Ferguson did not "make the States supreme in
regulating all the activities of insurance companies"; in fact,
insurance companies could do many things subject to federal
regulation, and "only when they are engaged in the 'business of
insurance' does the statute apply."52
The Supreme Court directed lower courts to look first to the
purpose of the state statute in determining whether it regulated
44 See Part IIB.
45 NationalSecurities, 393 US 453.

Id at 455.
47 15 USC § 78 (1994).
48 NationalSecurities, 393 US at 455.
49 SEC v National Securities,Inc, 252 F Supp 623, 626 (D Ariz 1966).
50 SEC v National Securities,Inc, 387 F2d 25 (9th Cir 1967), revd, 393 US 453 (1969).
46

51 NationalSecurities, 393 US at 457.
52 Id at 459-60.
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the "business of insurance."53 Because the Arizona provision at
issue sought to protect stockholder interests, the Supreme Court
reasoned that this law had little to do with the state regulation of
insurance and accordingly that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did
not apply.14 The Arizona law obliged the state's Director of
Insurance to approve a merger unless it: (1) was contrary to law;
(2) was inequitable to the stockholders of the companies; or (3)
would have substantially reduced the protection afforded to
policyholders.55 Justice Marshall acknowledged that parts of the
Arizona law were intended to regulate the business of insurance;
however, the Court held that a state statute that has the dual
purpose of protecting stockholders and the insured can be
preempted under certain circumstances.56 In this case, the federal
Securities Exchange Act only trumped state power in relation to
the part of the state statute intended to protect stockholders.
Therefore, the SEC could block the merger because of securities
law violations involving merger activity unrelated to the business
of insurance.
Drawing in part on South-Eastern Underwriters, Justice
Marshall concluded that the focus of the "business of insurance"
was on "the relationship between the insurance company and the
policyholder."57 Therefore, statutes that regulate this relationship
are laws "regulating the 'business of insurance."'58 Simply stated,
under National Securities, a state law regulating the "business of
insurance" is one that aims to protect or regulate the insurerinsured relationship.59 This was a narrowing of the existing
definition of "business of insurance."

53 Id at 457 ("The first question posed by this case is whether the relevant Arizona
statute is a 'law enacted... for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance' within
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.").
54 Id at 460. One commentator has pointed out that the Supreme Court ignored the
fact that the Arizona law was meant to protect both stockholders and policyholders. See
Davis J. Howard, Uncle Sam Versus the Insurance Commissioners: A Multi-Level
Approach to Defining the 'Business of Insurance' Under the McCarran-FergusonAct, 25
Willamette L Rev 1, 39-40 (1989) ("This conclusion was based on a false premise, because
the Arizona statute was aimed at protecting both stockholders and policyholders and the
statute did not suggest that it sought to provide more protection for one group than the
other.").
55 National Securities, 252 F Supp at 625.
56 See National Securities, 393 US at 462-63 ("Moreover, Arizona has approved the
merger not only under its laws relating to insurance securities but also in its capacity as
licensor of insurers within the State.").
57 Id at 460.
58

Id.

59 National Securities, 393 US at 460.
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B. "Business of Insurance" in the Antitrust Context
The National Securities decision left future courts with a
sketchily phrased and easily manipulated definition. In Group
Life & Health Insurance Co v Royal Drug Co6" and Union Labor
Life Insurance Co v Pireno,6" the Supreme Court had two
opportunities to define "business of insurance" in the antitrust
context. These rulings on the antitrust exemption to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act refined the National Securities definition
of "business of insurance."
1. Group Life & Health Insurance Co v Royal Drug Co.
In Royal Drug, Blue Shield marketed a prescription drug
insurance policy in compliance with Texas state law that
provided greater benefits and lower prices to policyholders who
purchased their medicine from a "participating pharmacy" than
to those who patronized "non-participating pharmacies."" A nonparticipating pharmacy sued, alleging that defendants violated
the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the price of drugs and create
a group boycott.6"
The district court used the National Securities definition of
"business of insurance': despite the fact that National Securities
was a first-clause McCarran-Ferguson case and the instant case
was an antitrust case governed by the second clause." Dismissing
the suit, the district court ruled that state law forestalled
application of the Sherman Act because Blue Shield's
arrangements with participating pharmacies were so closely
related to the insurance policy itself that the agreement with the
pharmacies affected the insured.6 5 Therefore, the agreement was
within the realm of the "business of insurance." 6

60 Group Life & Health Insurance Co v Royal Drug Co, 440 US 205 (1979).
61 Union Labor Life InsuranceCo v Pireno, 458 US 119 (1982).
62 Royal Drug, 440 US at 209. Participating pharmacies had entered into contracts
with Blue Shield guaranteeing the insured a maximum cost of $2.00 for filling a
prescription.
63 See id at 207.
64 See Royal Drug Co v Group Life and Health Insurance Co, 415 F Supp 343, 347-48
(W D Tex 1976), revd, 556 F2d 1375 (5th Cir 1977), affd, 440 US 205 (1979) (applying
National Securities definition).
65 Royal Drug, 415 F Supp at 347-48.
66

Id.
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The Fifth Circuit reversed this decision after also reviewing
the National Securities precedent.67 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that any cost reduction benefits of the insurer-pharmacy
agreements at best benefitted the insured only slightly."s
Accordingly, there was an insufficient connection between those
agreements and the insured to justify characterizing the
arrangement as part of the "business of insurance."69 The court
determined that any other conclusion would logically expand the
application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to transactions not
particular to the insurance industry.70
However, the Fifth Circuit's logic ignored the Supreme Court
language of National Securities that established a clear
distinction between the business of insurance and the business of
insurance companies. 7 The opinion also overlooked the fact that,
by virtue of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, the
insured would have to pay more to purchase a prescription at a
non-participating pharmacy.72 Part of the marketing appeal of
such a policy is the option for the insured to save money by
buying prescriptions from a participating pharmacy.73
The fact that the Fifth Circuit was defining "business of
insurance" in the antitrust context made a difference in its
analysis. This context brought into play "the general principle
that statutory exceptions to the antitrust laws 'are to be strictly
construed."'7 Therefore, in the antitrust context, the Fifth Circuit
defined "business of insurance" narrowly so as to leave pharmacy
agreements outside the boundaries of the phrase.75
In affirming the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court explained
the distinction between the two clauses of § 2(b) of the McCarranFerguson Act. Congress intended the first clause of § 2(b) to
further a primary purpose: preserving state regulation of

67 Royal Drug Co v Group Life and Health Insurance Co, 556 F2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir
1977), affd, 440 US 205 (1979).
68 Royal Drug, 556 F2d at 1386.
69 See id.
70 See id ("Thus, Blue Shield's attempts to control costs in the pharmaceutical

industry might just as easily be undertaken by a noninsurance firm.").
71 See National Securities, 393 US at 459-60 ("Insurance companies may do many
things which are subject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in
the 'business of insurance' does the statute apply.").
72 See Royal Drug, 440 US at 209.
73 See Howard, 25 Willamette L Rev at 50-51 (cited in note 54).
74 Royal Drug, 556 F2d at 1380.
75 Id.
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insurance companies. 76 The second clause addressed Congress'
"secondary" goal: granting insurance companies a limited
exemption from antitrust laws.77
In Royal Drug, the Supreme Court agreed that the pharmacy
agreements were not part of the "business of insurance," and
thus, were not exempt from federal antitrust laws. 78 Because
these agreements did not concern the underwriting or spreading
of risk and did not directly involve the insured, they were "legally
indistinguishable" from a normal business arrangement between
any two parties.79 Therefore, antitrust laws applied to the
insurer's conduct.8" Justice Stewart's opinion stated that, along
with the insurance policies themselves, only contracts among
members of the insurance industry fell within the boundaries of
the "business of insurance" standard.81
Although the Supreme Court cited National Securities in
making this analysis, it nonetheless effectively revived the
rationale of Paul v Virginia8 2 and the narrow view of what
constitutes "business of insurance."8 3 If only agreements
concerning the transfer of risk qualified as the business of
insurance, then many other facets of the relationship between the
insurer and insured would not qualify. Actions with respect to
current policyholders, such as payments on claims, would not
meet this standard. In a dissent joined by three other Justices,
Justice Brennan applied National Securities.84 He reasoned that
the pharmacy agreements counted as part of the "business of
insurance" because they were essential to the workings of the
76 Royal Drug, 440 US at 218-19 n 18 ("There is no question that the primarypurpose
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to preserve state regulation of the activities of
insurance companies.").
77 Id ("The question in the present case, however, is one under the quite different
secondary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act-to give insurance companies only a
limited exemption from the antitrust laws.").
78 Id at 232-33.
79 Id at 214-15.
80 See Royal Drug, 440 US at 219-20 (explaining that Congress did not extend the
antitrust exemption to the business of insurance companies).
81 Id at 231 ("Application of this principle [that antitrust exemptions are narrowly
construed] is particularly appropriate in this case because the Pharmacy Agreements
involve parties wholly outside the insurance industry.").
82 Paul, 75 US 168.
83 See notes 4-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paul. The Royal Drug
majority may have chosen to break new ground in the evolving definition of "business of
insurance" because it was deciding a second-clause antitrust case, and its only prior
opinion on the meaning of "business of insurance," National Securities was a first-clause,
preemption case.
84 See Royal Drug, 440 US at 247.
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insurance policies. Accordingly, Justice Brennan believed that
such arrangements should have been exempt under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act from federal antitrust regulation. 8
Instead, the Royal Drug majority considerably narrowed the
definition of "business of insurance" under both clauses of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Applicable precedent would have
permitted the Court either to use a distinct definition of "business
of insurance" in second-clause cases or to apply the first-clause
definition using a new analytical framework. However, the Court
applied the first-clause definition to a second-clause case and
narrowed it in the process. This move greatly influenced
subsequent McCarran-Ferguson cases.
2. Union Labor Life Insurance Co v Pireno.
The Supreme Court's next addressed "business of insurance"
three years later in Pireno, and it was again in the antitrust
context. In that case, on the advice of a peer review committee of
the New York State Chiropractic Association (the "NYSCA"), an
insurance company declined to reimburse policyholders treated
by Pireno, in part because the NYSCA felt he engaged in
unnecessary treatments and charged excessive prices.86 Pireno
sued, alleging that the insurer and the association conspired to
fix his prices in violation of the Sherman Act.8" The district court
dismissed the action on the ground that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's antitrust exemption barred relief.8 8
The Second Circuit, recognizing that Royal Drug and
National Securities established different tests,8 9 followed Royal
Drug and concluded that the NYSCA's peer review process
neither transferred nor spread any risk.90 Accordingly, the
activities of the peer review committee did not qualify as part of
the insurance industry.9 Because the peer review process did not
85 See id at 252-53 (Brennan dissenting). Brennan did state, however, that "not ...
all provider agreements come within the McCarran-Ferguson Act proviso." Id at 253.
86 Union Labor Life Insurance Co v Pireno,458 US 119, 123 (1982).
87 See id at 124.
88 Pireno v New York State Chiropractic Association, 1979-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
62,758 at 78,377-79 (S D NY 1979), revd, 650 F2d 387 (2d Cir 1981) (ruling that the peer
review committee's role was sufficiently important to the settlement of claims to qualify as
the business of insurance).
89 Pireno v New York State ChiropracticAssociation, 650 F2d 387, 394 (2d Cir 1981)
("Royal Drug sets forth a substantially narrower scope for the 'business of insurance'
exemption than its approving citation of NationalSecurities might suggest.").
90 See id at 393.
91 See id at 394-95.
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fall under Royal Drug's narrow interpretation of "business of
insurance," the court permitted Pireno to sue under the federal
antitrust laws.92 The Second Circuit did not determine whether
its interpretation only applied in the antitrust context.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision.93
Noting that exemptions from federal antitrust laws should be
narrowly construed,94 the Supreme Court developed three criteria
for determining whether McCarran-Ferguson exempts a given
practice from federal antitrust laws: "[Fjirst,whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry."95 Importantly, no single factor is determinative.
Rather, courts should examine the practice in relation to all
criteria." The Pirenotest for "business of insurance," when put in
practice, excluded claims adjustments performed by a third party
(such as a peer review committee) because such practices did not
satisfy any of the three criteria.97
C. "Business of Insurance" in the Preemption Context
Pireno left unanswered the question of whether the definition
of "business of insurance" that emerged in cases under the second
clause of § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would apply in
first-clause cases as well. After Pireno, courts interpreting the
Act's first clause were left to decide whether to follow National
Securities or the Royal Drug-Pireno line of cases. Moreover,
courts also struggled to determine whether both clauses would
use the same definition of "business of insurance."

92

See id at 395.

93 Pireno, 458 US at 127-29.
94 Id at 126 ("Our precedents consistently hold that exemptions from the antitrust

laws must be construed narrowly.").
95 Id at 129.
96 See id. This exemplifies the case-by-case
decisions. See text accompanying note 43.
97 See Pireno, 458 US at 130-33.

nature of "business of insurance"
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1. The period between Pirenoand Fabe.
An early example of this struggle is Gordon v United States
Department of Treasury.9" In that case, the federal government
claimed it had priority among all the creditors of an insolvent
insurer, although Maryland law stipulated otherwise.99 The
district court noted that Royal Drug and Pireno "effectively define
and limit the antitrust exemption set out in the McCarranFerguson Act."' 0
Despite those statements, the district court did not hesitate
to apply Pireno to Gordon, a first-clause preemption case.0 1 The
court ruled in favor of the federal government and held that the
state law did not involve the "business of insurance."0 2 Thus,
federal law could preempt state law. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the district court correctly applied the law and
that the Pireno definition was not limited to the antitrust
context.0 3
The Ninth Circuit reached a different outcome in a similar
case. In Soward v United States,"°4 the court overturned a district
court's ruling that a California statute regarding the priority of
creditors of an insolvent insurer pertained to the "business of
insurance." 5 The Ninth Circuit stated, "Although ostensibly
appearing to speak to the precise issue raised here, neither Royal
Drug nor Pireno are necessary to decide this case. Both cases are
refinements

...

of National Securities tailored

to address

activities of insurance companies that would implicate the
antitrust laws."' 6 The court ruled that since the insolvent
companies no longer sold insurance, the state liquidation statute
was "wholly unrelated to the relationship between insurer and
insured."0 7 Because not even the broad definition of "business of
insurance" found in National Securities had been met, the court

98 Gordon v United States Departmentof the Treasury, 668 F Supp 483 (D Md 1987),
affd 846 F2d 272 (4th Cir 1988).
99 See Gordon, 668 F Supp at 486.
100 Id at 487.
101 Id at 489.
102

Id at 491.

See Gordon, 846 F2d at 273.
Soward v United States, 858 F2d 445 (9th Cir 1988).
105 Soward v United States, 662 F Supp 60, 63 (D Idaho 1987).
1o6 Soward, 858 F2d at 453.
103
104

107

Id at 452.
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declined to engage in the Pireno analysis.1 °5 In refusing to apply
Royal Drug or Pireno to a first-clause case, the Ninth Circuit
drew a clear distinction between the antitrust and non-antitrust
contexts.
2.

United States Departmentof the Treasury v Fabe.

The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the problem of how
to apply Pireno in first-clause McCarran-Ferguson Act cases in
United States Department of the Treasury v Fabe.1°9 The Fabe
Court considered whether a federal statute could legitimately
preempt an Ohio law designating the priority of creditors' claims
in insurance-liquidation proceedings.11 To resolve the case, the
Court had to decide whether Ohio had enacted its law for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance."'
Ohio argued that application of "business of insurance," but
not the definition of the phrase, should differ in antitrust and
preemption c-ases. 12 To bolster the state's argument for a broad
application in a first-clause case, Ohio's brief cited Justice
Brennan's conclusion that courts should construe antitrust
exemptions narrowly.'
The federal government argued that the Ohio statute was not
shielded from preemption by the McCarran-Ferguson Act because
the statute addressed only the relationship between policyholders
and other creditors of the insurance company, and therefore met
none of the three Pireno criteria.114 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and found that the first clause of § 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act covered the Ohio law and that Ohio had
intended its law to protect the interests of the insured. Unlike the
pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug or the committee reviews in
Pireno, payments from an insolvent insurer related to the
108 See id at 453 ("Although ostensibly appearing to speak to the precise issue raised
here, neither Royal Drug nor Pireno are [sic] necessary to decide this case.").
109 Fabe, 508 US at 502-03.
110 Id at 493.

Ill Id.
112 See Fabe, 508 US 491, Respondent's Brief, 1992 WL 511969, *16 n 18 ("Respondent
believes that it is the application of the definition of the phrase 'business of insurance,' not
the definition itself, which may differ in an anti-trust exemption case under McCarranFerguson.").
113 See id ("The definition must be applied narrowly in the anti-trust exemption case").
Implicitly, the state argued that a broad definition would then be acceptable in the nonantitrust context. Id.
114 See Fabe, 508 US 491, Petitioner's Brief, 1992 WL 511967, *7 (explaining why the
Ohio statute does not regulate the business of insurance).
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performance of the original insurance contract."' Accordingly, the
federal government could not preempt such legislation.1 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun conceded that the
Supreme Court had construed the first clause of the McCarranFerguson Act only once, in National Securities.'1 7 He declined to
equate laws "enacted ... for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance" with the business of insurance itself.1 '
Although the dissenting opinion charged that this reading "runs
counter to the basic rule of statutory construction that identical
words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to
have the same meaning,"1 9 Blackmun responded that the dissent
overlooks a different standard of statutory construction, namely,
"that a court should give effect, if possible, to every clause and
120
word of a statute."
Noting that both Royal Drug and Pireno involved antitrust
immunity, Justice Blackmun wrote that the first clause of § 2(b)
was not as narrowly circumscribed as the second clause. 2 '
Because laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance necessarily deal with matters involving the
management of the insurance industry, such laws encompass
more than what courts in earlier cases defined as the business of
insurance. 22
Accordingly, the Fabe Court looked at whether the
application of the federal statute would "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" the Ohio law. 12 ' The federal statute could not do so if
the purpose of the Ohio law were to regulate the business of
insurance.124 Instead of applying the narrow definition from Royal
115 See id.

116 See Fabe, 508 US at 504 (finding Ohio's law integrally related to the performance of
contracts after bankruptcy: "[tihe Ohio priority statute is designed to carry out the
enforcement of insurance contracts by ensuring the payment of policyholders' claims
despite the insurance company's intervening bankruptcy"). Therefore, Ohio's law was one
.enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Id, quoting
15 USC § 1012(b).
117 See Fabe, 508 US at 501 ("This Court has had occasion to construe this phrase only
once.").
11 Id at 504, quoting 15 USC § 1012(b).
119 Id at 515 (Kennedy dissenting).
120 Fabe, 508 US at 504 n 6 (majority), quoting Moskal v United States, 498 US 103,
109-10 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Fabe, 508 US at 504 ("We deal here with the first clause, which is not so narrowly
circumscribed [as the second clause].").
122 Id at 505 (stating that the first clause "necessarily encompasses more than just the
'business of insurance'").
123 15 USC § 10 12(b).
124 See Fabe, 508 US at 500-01, citing similar language in 15 USC § 1012(b).
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Drug and Pireno, the Fabe Court wrote that "[tihe broad category
of laws enacted 'for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance' consists of laws that possess the 'end, intention, or
aim' of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of
insurance."' 2 5
Thus Fabe created a new standard, not directly based on
Pireno,for laws governed by the first clause of § 2(b).126 The Court
referred to the three-part Pireno test,'27 derived from Royal Drug,
but significantly adapted it for non-antitrust analysis. Despite
the Supreme Court's efforts, Fabe did not put an end to confusion
over the definition of "business of insurance."
D. How Lower Courts Have Reacted to Pirenoand Fabe
After Fabe's analysis, the federal courts continue to struggle
with "business of insurance" cases. The question troubling lower
courts in the wake of Fabe is whether they should completely
disregard the Pireno test in first-clause cases. Those lower courts
that apply Pireno in first-clause cases must also decide whether a
broader application of "business of insurance" is necessary
outside of the antitrust context. Various federal courts reached
dissimilar answers to these questions.
Courts that opt for the Pireno test choose a narrow definition
of what constitutes "business of insurance." This definition
focuses on whether the activity spreads a policyholder's risk,
whether the activity is an integral part of the relationship
whether the activity is
between the insurer and the insured, and
128
limited to within the insurance industry.
1.

Decisions finding Pirenoinapplicable to
first-clause jurisprudence.

Courts that reject the Pireno test in first-clause cases
effectively choose a more inclusive approach. In defining laws
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
the National Securities Court simply looked at whether the
statute aimed at protecting or regulating the relationship
between the insurer and the insured.'29 By focusing on the

125
126
127
128
129

Fabe, 508 US at 505.
Id.
See text accompanying note 95.
See Fabe, 508 US at 498 (listing the factors in the Pireno test).
NationalSecurities, 393 US at 460. See also text accompanying notes 43-60.
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spreading of the policyholder's risk, Pireno limits what can be
defined as "business of insurance" and, in the first-clause context,
protects fewer state laws from federal preemption.13 °
An example of this approach is Colonial Life & Accident
Insurance Co v American Family Life Assurance Co,' where a
federal district court applied the broader National Securities
analysis. The court ruled that a state law regulating insurance
advertising fell within the boundaries of "business of insurance"
for purposes of the first clause of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
because the law affected the insurer-insured relationship.'32 The
court held that Pireno only controls in second-clause antitrust
cases and that the first clause "encompasses more types of
activities than does the second clause."' 3 The district court's
opinion stated that the Pireno criteria "are not determinative
with respect to the first clause of Section 2(b)." 134 Had the
Colonial Life court applied the Pireno test, the court probably
would not have reached the same conclusion. Insurance
advertising neither affects the transfer of the policyholder's risk
nor forms an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured.135
Two circuit courts have adopted the position that Pireno
should not control in first-clause cases. In Doe v Norwest Bank
Minnesota,'36 the Eighth Circuit construed Fabe as recognizing
that Pireno is "relevant only in cases involving a conflict between
state law and federal antitrust law."'37 In Norwest Bank, a
borrower had brought a RICO claim against the defendant bank.
The Eighth Circuit ruled "that the intrusion of RICO's
substantial damage provisions into a state's insurance regulatory
program may so impair the state law as to bar application of
RICO."'38 Therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act barred the
RICO claim.' 39
130

See Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co v American Family Life Assurance Co of

Columbus, 846 F Supp 454, 459-60 (D SC 1994) (discussing results of the different
treatment courts afford Pireno).
131 Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co v American Family Life Assurance Co of
Columbus, 846 F Supp 454 (D SC 1994).
133

See id at 460.
Id at 459.

134

Id.

132

135 Pireno, 458 US at 129. See also text accompanying note 95.
136

Doe v Norwest Bank Minnesota, 107 F3d 1297 (8th Cir 1997).

137 Id at 1305-06 n 8.
138
139

Id at 1307.
See id at 1308.
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In Autry v Northwest Premium Services, Inc, 40 the Seventh

Circuit reached a similar conclusion that Pireno applies only to
antitrust cases.'" While confessing "uncertainty" as to whether
Pireno applied in the first-clause context, the court nonetheless
declared that it did not "understand Fabe to require the Pireno
analysis in this situation."4 Indeed, the court considered the
Pireno factors' focus on the particular activity to be too narrow for
a first-clause analysis."4 The court wrote that Pireno would not
"capture all of the statutes that were 'enacted . .. for the purpose
'
of regulating the business of insurance.

1 44

Declining to apply Pireno, the Autry court used the broader
analysis of National Securities to examine the purpose of the
state statute, rather than the activity regulated by the statute. 45
The Seventh Circuit panel held that a state statute regulating
premium financing for the purchase of automobile insurance only
served to protect the interests of the borrower.'46 That the
borrower also happened to be the insured did not protect the
statute from federal preemption by the Truth in Lending Act.'47
2. Applying Pireno to first-clause cases: a middle ground?
Other courts have reached different conclusions. In
Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc v Frank B. Hall & Co,
Inc, 4 ' the Ninth Circuit read Fabe in another way and held that
Fabe was an application of the Pireno tripartite test.149 The
Merchants Home court determined that the antitrust test merely
applies more broadly in first-clause cases and that the distinction
"is a matter of degree, however, rather than a wholesale change
140 Autry v Northwest Premium Services, Inc, 144 F3d 1037 (7th Cir 1998).
141

142
143

Id at 1044 n 5.
See id.
Id at 1041-42.

144 Autry, 144 F3d at 1041.
145 National Securities, 393 US at 457. "The first question posed by this case is
whether the [state law] is a 'law enacted ... for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.'" Id, quoting 15 USC § 1012(b).
146 See Autry, 144 F3d at 1044 ("[Tlhe critical point is that the state is attempting to
protect the interests of the borrower qua borrower.").
147 See id ("The statute may serve to protect someone who happens to be an 'insured,'
but it does not protect that person in his capacity as a party to a contract of insurance.
The fact that the money borrowed ultimately pays insurance premiums is incidental.").
148 Merchants Home Delivery Serv, Inc v Frank B. Hall & Co, Inc, 50 F3d 1486 (9th Cir
1995).
149 Id at 1490 n 2 ("In Fabe, the Supreme Court actually applied the [Pireno factors],
emphasizing that the acts involved there affected the transfer or spreading of risk.").
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in the inquiry."150 A second court read Fabe similarly-as directly

applying the Pireno test to first-clause cases-albeit with the
distinction that "the interpretation of 'the business of insurance'
is broader in a situation which does not involve the antitrust
exemption."151
Courts have searched for some middle ground in the
application of Pireno to first-clause cases. In Ambrose v Blue
Cross & Blue Shield,15 a district court noted that the uncertainty
stemmed from Fabe's distinction of Royal Drug and Pireno on the
basis that they involved the second clause of § 2(b) as opposed to
the first.15 At the same time, however, "the [Fabel Court
concluded that 'the actual performance of an insurance contract
falls within the "business of insurance,"
as we understood that
54
phrase in Pireno and Royal Drug."1

The Ambrose court reviewed the split between Colonial Life
and Merchants Home Delivery and determined that "[allthough
the Pireno analysis was developed in cases addressing the second
clause of Section 2(b), it is relevant to the first clause for the
limited purpose of defining the business of insurance."'55 A state
law controls under the first clause, the Ambrose court held, "so
long as its purpose, that is, its 'end, intention, or aim,' is
'adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of insurance.""56
Under the second clause, according to the Ambrose court, a
state-regulated practice is "exempt from the antitrust laws to the
extent that the practice regulated is itself the business of
insurance."'57 Ambrose concluded that the Pireno analysis is
irrelevant to the broader inquiry into statutory purpose that the
first clause of § 2(b) requires.'58 By the Ambrose court's reasoning,
150 Id ("[Tihe [Fabe Court held the business of insurance was to be defined more
broadly outside the antitrust area.").
151 Kachanis v United States, 844 F Supp 877, 881-82 (D RI 1994) (ruling that the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) was preempted by a state insolvency
statute, and therefore, that the United States could not collect from the insolvency fund on
behalf of a federal employee). FECA was ruled to not specifically relate to the business of
insurance. Id.
152 Ambrose v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 891 F Supp 1153 (E D Va 1995) (holding that
application of RICO was precluded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
153 Id at 1160.
154 Id, quoting Fabe, 508 US at 503.
155 Ambrose, 891 F Supp at 1160 (emphasis added).
156 Id, quoting Fabe, 508 US at 505.
157 Ambrose, 891 F Supp at 1160.
158 Id at 1160-61 ("Thus, to the extent that Pireno and Royal Drug consider whether
the practice being regulated is itself the business of insurance, their analysis is
inapplicable in a case controlled by the broader first clause of Section 2(b).").
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Fabe requires a court to examine of the purpose of a state statute
under the first clause of § 2(b), while Pireno urges courts to look
directly at the business practice being regulated under the second
clause of § 2(b).'5 9 According to Ambrose, both clauses employ the
phrase "business of insurance," but because of the plain language
of the statute, each clause requires a separate examination.16
The key difference between the clauses for the Ambrose court was
the use of the word "purpose" in the first clause.
Accordingly, Ambrose ruled that the first clause of § 2(b), as
determined by Fabe, affords the states broad leeway to regulate
the business of insurance without federal interference. 6 ' Under
the second clause, as read by Pireno, the antitrust exemption is
more narrow than the exemption articulated in the first clause.'6 2
Reaching a similar conclusion to that of the Ambrose court,
the Third Circuit recently noted that "federal courts have
seemingly disagreed as to the proper analytic inquiry into
McCarran-Ferguson Act preclusion." 63 That court found the
Pireno test helpful in a first-clause case, but only that it "may...
provide guidance in a more generalized analysis."" 4 Finding fault
with the anti-Pirenocases, like Norwest Bank, the opinion noted
that even Fabe cited Royal Drug as a starting point in its
"business of insurance" analysis. 65
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit used Pireno in its first-clause
analysis in Blackfeet National Bank v Nelson.'6 6 The court
claimed to have a coherent view of the Fabe distinction between
the clauses, but the court nonetheless still found Pireno
appropriate in the first-clause context on the theory that courts
should interpret "business of insurance" uniformly in both
clauses.'6 7 The Blackfeet National Bank court considered whether
159 See id.

See id.
See Ambrose, 891 F Supp at 1157-58.
162 See text accompanying note 154.
163 Sabo v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 137 F3d 185, 189 n 2 (3d Cir 1998) (holding
that RICO was not precluded by McCarran-Ferguson where, unlike Ambrose, there was no
state enforcement law excluding private causes of action and treble damages; therefore,
RICO did not invalidate, impair or supersede state law).
164 Id at 191 (finding the sale and marketing of Metropolitan Life's policies so clearly
constituting the "business of insurance" that "We need not delve into a sophisticated three
part analysis under Royal Drug or Pireno to reach this conclusion"). The court stated that
Pireno'sguidance based on first-clause cases was not necessary. Id.
165 Id at 191 n 3, citing Fabe, 508 US at 503-05 (1993). Royal Drug was the precursor
to Pireno. See text accompanying notes 86-97.
166 Blackfeet Natl Bank v Nelson, 171 F3d 1237, 1246-48 (11th Cir 1994).
167 See id at 1246 n 13.
160
161
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Florida could regulate a bank's marketing of a specific retirement
certificate of deposit.'68 Ruling that the product involved the
business of insurance, the court used the Pireno factors to bolster
its decision, despite the fact that the case did not involve
antitrust.'69 "We merely need to determine whether offering ...
[the product] constitutes the 'business of insurance.' We cannot
imagine that 'business of insurance' could have two different
meanings in the same statutory subsection." 7 ° Because the court
was analyzing the practice itself rather than the purpose of the
statute, it found Pireno applicable to a first-clause case.
III. HOW TO APPLY PIRENO TO FIRST-CLAUSE CASES
The use of the phrase "business of insurance" in consecutive
sentences in the McCarran-Ferguson Act has evidently caused
much confusion in the courts.' 7 ' An oft-applied rule of statutory
construction is that "identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning."'72 The
difference between the antitrust and preemption contexts and the
unfortunate wording of the Act itself has frustrated an easy
application of this rule of statutory construction. The Blackfeet
National Bank decision is the latest manifestation of this
dilemma, as that court applied Pireno in a first-clause analysiswhich some other courts have counseled against.'
The legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides some clues as to whether the phrase "business of
insurance" has separate definitions in the antitrust and
preemption contexts. Prior to South-Eastern Underwriters,
legislators introduced bills in Congress to grant the insurance
industry an exemption from antitrust laws. After the upheaval
caused by the Supreme Court's groundbreaking decision, the
purpose of the legislation changed markedly to give state
insurance regulation primacy over federal regulation.'74

Id at 1239.
Id at 1246 n 13.
170 Blackfeet Natl Bank, 171 F3d at 1246 n 13.
171 See Part II D.
172 Sullivan v Stroop, 496 US 478, 484 (1990), quoting Sorenson v Treasury, 475 US
851, 860 (1986).
173 See text accompanying notes 166-70.
174 See Howard, 25 Willamette L Rev at 38 (cited in note 54) ("The focus shifted from a
narrow exemption from the Sherman and Clayton Acts to a general policy of exemption
with specific exceptions to that policy."), quoting National Securities, 387 F2d at 29.
168
169
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After South-Eastern Underwriters, lawmakers added the
preemption clause to the antitrust exemption to ensure that
states retained authority to regulate the insurance industry.'
The preemption clause was necessary to restore the federalist
holding of Paul that insurance regulation was a state, and not a
federal, power. The Senate passed an amendment that returned
antitrust authority to the federal government, but the House
deleted this amendment without explanation. 7 ' The conference
committee adopted substantially the House version of the bill.'77
When the Senate debated the final bill, Senator Ferguson
defended the return of the antitrust exemption, stating that open
competition in insurance rates would cause "chaos."' This
rebirth of the antitrust exemption had nothing to do with
federalist impulses, but rather reflected a fear that open
competition in insurance rates would bankrupt many insurance
companies. Congress enacted the first clause of § 2(b) because of
federalist concerns, while it inserted the antitrust clause because
"it was not sound policy to apply the antitrust laws in the
insurance market." 7 ' The legislative history indicates that
Congress had two separate purposes for enacting the McCarranFerguson Act.
The Fabe Court recognized the dual purpose of McCarranFerguson, noting that the first clause "was intended to further
Congress' primary objective of granting the States broad
regulatory authority ...

. The second clause accomplishes

Congress' secondary goal, which was to carve out only a narrow
exemption for 'the business of insurance' from the federal
antitrust laws." 8° Thus, "business of insurance" can have two
separate definitions reflecting Congress' distinct goals in passing
175 See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Expressing the Intent of the Congress with
Reference to the Regulation of the Business of Insurance, S Rep No 20, 79th Cong,
1st Sess 1-3 (1945).
176 See House Committee on the Judiciary, Expressing the Intent of the Congress with
Reference to the Regulation of the Business of Insurance, H Rep No 143, 79th Cong,
1st Sess 2-4 (1945), reprinted in 1945 US Code & Cong Serv 670-73.
177 See Expressing the Intent of the Congress with Reference to the Regulation of the
Business of Insurance, H Rep No 213, 79th Cong, 1st Sess 1-3 (1945) (conference report to
accompany S 340).
178 See 91 Cong Rec 1481 (Jan 25, 1945). Ferguson stated, "[Tihe insurance companies
have convinced many members of the legislature that we cannot have open competition in
fixing rates on insurance. If we do, we shall have chaos. There will be failures, and
failures always follow losses." Id.
179 Note, The Definition of "Business of Insurance"Under the McCarran-FergusonAct
After Royal Drug, 80 Colum L Rev 1475, 1483 (1980).
'80 Fabe, 508 US at 505. See also Royal Drug, 440 US at 219 n 18, for further
discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's dual purpose.
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the Act. With this legislative history as background, Royal Drug
should not affect the law outside the antitrust context.18 ' Because
Pireno descended from Royal Drug, the dual-purpose theory
contradicts the application of Pireno to first-clause cases by the
Blackfeet NationalBank and Merchants Home Delivery courts. 8'
Even if one accepts the dual-purpose theory of the McCarranFerguson Act, it does not mean that the phrase "business of
insurance" must have two different definitions.'83 Prior to Fabe,
one commentator reached this conclusion, however, and
counseled that courts should ignore Royal Drug and Pireno in
first-clause cases. 8 4 The commentator argued that in order to
resolve the conflicting Supreme Court decisions and to fulfill
congressional intent, only National Securities should govern in
preemption cases because Royal Drug and Pireno are antitrust
cases.' 85 After Fabe, however, all first-clause "definition of
insurance" cases must be examined in light of Fabe's use,
however minimal, of Royal Drug and Pireno.8 The dual-purpose
theory remains relevant in considering the scope of each clause
and the appropriate use of Pireno in first-clause cases.
Fabe has failed to alleviate the confusion among lower
courts.'87 Courts have even doubted whether Fabe applies
Pireno88 To clarify this controversy, courts should acknowledge
that Fabe created its own analysis for determining whether a
state law deserves protection from federal preemption under the
first clause of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'89 "The broad category
of laws enacted 'for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance' consists of laws that possess the 'end, intention, or
aim' of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of
insurance." 9 ° This analysis is different from the Pireno test,
181 See Note, 80 Colum L Rev at 1484 (cited in note 179).
182
183

See text accompanying notes 148-51 and 166-70. .
See Fabe, 508 US at 515 (Kennedy dissenting) ("As an initial matter, it would be

unusual to conclude that the meaning of the phrase 'business of insurance' is transformed
from one clause to the next.").
184 Howard, 25 Willamette L Rev at 79 (cited in note 54) ("[Tlhe disposition of
superpriority [first clause] litigation should not be controlled by the decisions in Royal
Drug and Pireno.").
185 Id at 79-82 ("Should a court feel constrained to rely on cases, it should look to
Prudentialand National Securities.").
186 See text accompanying notes 124-28.
187

See Part II D.

188 See text accompanying notes 131-70.
189 Fabe, 508 US at 505.
190 Id.
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which determines what the "business of insurance" encompasses
instead of looking at the purpose of the law at hand. 9 '
When investigating whether the Ohio law in Fabe regulated
the business of insurance, the Fabe Court did indeed look to the
understanding developed in Pireno and Royal Drug of what
constituted the business of insurance.'92 The Court qualified this
analysis, however, by acknowledging that Congress intended a
narrower antitrust exemption than the relative breadth of the
first clause.193 Also, as a first-clause analysis, the Fabe approach
could not stop with the Pireno test, but also had to examine the
purpose of the statute.
A middle approach, perhaps best articulated in Blackfeet
National Bank, is an appropriate solution.' Blackfeet National
Bank used the Pireno test to analyze the specific activity in the
case-the marketing of retirement certificates of deposit-but not
the purpose of the statute. Courts should recognize that Pireno
can be helpful in first-clause non-antitrust cases, but that it is
only a starting point.'9 5 Courts should apply the second clause
more narrowly than the first. This is not because the phrase
"business of insurance" has separate meanings. Rather, the first
clause uses slightly different language, that is, "any law enacted
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance."'9 6 The use of the word "purpose" signals the broader
and more inclusive application of the first clause. The broad
category of statutes with the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance "necessarily encompasses more than just the 'business
' 1 This approach would also mark a return of the
of insurance.""'
rarely cited, but broad, definition of "business of insurance" found
in United States v South-Eastern Underwriters.9 ' The Pireno test
should not be definitive in first-clause cases.

191 See text accompanying note 95.
192 Fabe, 508 US at 503-05. "[T]he actual performance of an insurance contract falls
within the 'business of insurance,' as we understood that phrase in Pireno and Royal
Drug." Id at 503.
193 Id at 505 (stating that the first clause grants states "broad regulatory authority,"
while the second clause "carve[s] out only a narrow exemption ...from the federal
antitrust laws").
194 See text accompanying notes 166-70.
195 See text accompanying note 164.
196 15 USC § 1012(b).
197 Fabe, 508 US at 505.
198 322 US 533 at 537 (1944). See text accompanying notes 28-29.
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CONCLUSION

"Business of insurance" cases have caused sufficient grief in
McCarran-Ferguson Act jurisprudence. The correct approach
takes the best of each extreme of the argument: recognizing that
the preemption and antitrust clauses are fundamentally
different, while noting that the antitrust cases can provide
direction to preemption analysis. There are not two separate
meanings of the phrase "business of insurance," but two separate
applications depending on the clauses and context of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.

